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Financial developments in Spain in 2010 were strongly influenced by the tension in the 
euro area financial markets. The most difficult moments stemmed from the debt crises 
of Greece (between May and June) and Ireland (between November and December), 
which prompted requests for financial assistance by these two economies. For the 
reasons explained in detail in Chapter 1 of this Annual Report, Spain was among the 
countries most affected by the ensuing crisis of confidence: the imbalances accumu-
lated during the phase of expansion and some areas of vulnerability aggravated by the 
crisis (such as labour market rigidities or certain structural aspects of the functioning 
of savings banks) fuelled investors’ misgivings. These tensions led to significant tight-
ening of financing conditions in wholesale markets, where risk premia rose and funds 
became less readily available. The most strongly affected sectors were general govern-
ment and credit institutions, which are the ones that raise most funds in these markets 
(see Box 6.1).
To address the crisis, European and national authorities took measures in various areas.1 
In the national financial area, which is the subject of this chapter, it should be remembered, 
first, that in 2009 the FROB had already been set up for the dual purpose of providing a 
solution for the institutions that had ceased to be viable and of promoting the integration 
of viable institutions by expediting their restructuring.
Action was taken in 2010 to increase financial transparency and so restore the confidence 
of investors in the Spanish financial system. Noteworthy here was the performance and 
publication, in coordination with the other EU authorities, of banking system stress tests in 
July 2010, which in Spain were conducted on a large number of institutions (well above the 
50% required), including all savings banks. Moreover, the results were published in greater 
detail. Subsequently, first savings banks, and subsequently all other banks, had to make 
public their level of exposure to the real estate sector (at end-2009) and disclose express-
ly and in detail each type of transaction and the collateral taken, as well as the amount, 
broken down by category, of potentially troubled loans to the sector (non-performing, 
doubtful, standard under special surveillance and foreclosed).
In the regulatory field, summer 2010 saw a tightening of provisioning rules, which were al-
ready comparatively more stringent in Spain than in other countries. The new legislation 
hastened the requirement to provision all past-due loans, albeit recognising explicitly the 
value of collateral (after severe haircuts). Also, the requirements regarding foreclosed as-
sets and assets given in satisfaction of debt were tightened to encourage their prompt sale. 
At that time savings bank law was reformed to remedy the main structural weaknesses of 
this sub-sector. More specifically, the professional standards required of savings bank man-
agers and directors were tightened and new channels established for raising high quality 
funds, through, among other options, the indirect exercise of financial activity via a public 
limited company having the nature of a commercial bank and able to issue ordinary shares.
The resurgence of tensions at the end of the year was conducive to the approval of Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2011, which raised the minimum required core capital to 8% or 10% of risk-
weighted assets, depending on certain characteristics of the institution (percentage of 
1 Introduction
Euro area financial market 
tensions shaped financial 
developments in Spain
Given this situation, numerous 
measures were taken in the 
financial area
1  For more details, see also Box 1.2 of this Annual Report.
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The public debt crisis caused problems of market confidence in 
various euro area are economies, with Spain among the countries 
most strongly affected. This meant that, in the two main waves of 
the crisis (in spring, centred on Greece, and in autumn 2010, in 
Ireland), risk premia rose on the securities issued by resident sec-
tors and fundraising became more difficult, especially for credit 
institutions. In the two bouts of the crisis, the measures taken by 
Spanish and European authorities finally contributed to the easing 
of tensions.
In the case of general government, the misgivings of the markets 
were accompanied by the downgrading of Spanish sovereign debt 
BOX 6.1THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TENSIONS ON RESIDENT SECTOR FINANCING
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(S&P downgraded it from AA+ to AA in April 2010, Fitch down-
graded from AAA to AA+ in May, Moody’s from Aaa to Aa1 in Sep-
tember 2010 and then to Aa2 in March 2011). As a result of the 
deterioration of investor confidence, the cost of issuance rose 
from below 3.9% for 10-year bonds in December 2009 to more 
than 5.4% a year later, while the spread with respect to the Ger-
man bund, which was barely 60 bp in December 2009, rose to 200 
bp in June and 290 bp in late November 2010 (see Chart 1). Sub-
sequently, this risk premium tended downward amidst high volatil-
ity, although it continues to be high and subject to significant fluc-
tuations.
Financial institutions, some of whose credit ratings were down-
graded, were also affected by problems of investor confidence. 
Thus, the cost of issuing mortgage covered bonds (these assets, 
since they are secured by the best collateral, are those that have 
been most readily accepted by investors since the beginning of 
the economic and financial crisis) has increased considerably and, 
as result, the spread over the swap interest rate has risen from 
around 60 bp in 2009 to more than 290 bp on average in the clos-
ing months of 2010 (see Chart 2). Credit default swap (CDS) 
premia also increased. As with general government securities, in 
the opening months of 2011 the risk premia on securities issued 
by financial institutions decreased, although they remain well 
above their levels of 2009.
The crisis not only increased market financing costs, but also, 
when tensions were at a peak, affected the amount of funds 
raised by credit institutions. Thus, at the most critical time of the 
first wave of tension (in May and June), gross issuance by these 
institutions was insufficient to cover the maturities of outstand-
ing debt (see Chart 3). Hence, like the banks of other European 
countries, they had to resort to the liquidity provided by the Eu-
rosystem, a peak of €130 bn being reached in July (see Chart 4). 
At end-2010 net issuance again turned negative amidst the ten-
sions accompanying the Irish crisis, but on this occasion banks 
were able to cover their funding needs through repos traded in 
international central counterparty clearing houses (such as LCH, 
Clearnet or Eurex Clearing), once some of them had become 
members of these systems which diversify the risks assumed by 
providers of funds. In this way, recourse to the Eurosystem was 
reduced.
The tighter fundraising conditions in the wholesale markets also 
lead to an increase in competition for deposits, which caused 
the interest rates on these transactions to rise during the year 
from 1.3% in February 2010 to 1.6% in March 2011. The in-
crease in costs was not passed through immediately to house-
hold and corporate loans, since these had some leeway to ab-
sorb the shock. However, the increase in the margins applied to 
these transactions from the beginning of 2011 cannot be ex-
plained by their ordinary behaviour, indicating that a gradual 
pass-through seems to have commenced (see Chart 5. Hence, if 
the interest rates on new loans are compared with the projec-
tions derived from an interbank rate transmission model and the 
cyclical position of the Spanish economy, it can be seen that, 
both for house purchase loans to households and for loans to 
non-financial corporations, the rates remained in line with ex-
pectations for most of the year, but from early 2011 there was an 
increase in financial costs not explained by the model.1 Also, 
according to the bank lending survey, credit institutions slightly 
tightened credit standards in 2010 Q2, mainly as a result of the 
effect of market tensions, although subsequently they seem to 
have held them unchanged until the opening months of 2011, 
when they again tightened them in the household financing seg-
ment (see Chart 6).
Turning to non-financial corporations, there was also an increase 
in the cost of raising funds in the markets, the channel used by the 
largest firms, although less so than by financial firms and general 
government (see Chart 2). Unquestionably, the high international 
diversification of non-financial corporations contributed to them 
being less affected by the financial tensions.
Although tensions eased in the opening months of 2011, spreads 
and risk premia continue to be high. The persistence or worsening 
of this situation would entail some risks for the Spanish economy. 
Thus, in the case of general government, the higher interest rates 
demanded by the market, although they slowly pass through to 
the debt burden (at the pace that maturing debt is rolled over), 
exert continuous pressure on public finances. This weakens the 
net interest income of banks because the higher cost of liabilities 
cannot be passed through to loans that have already been grant-
ed. Lastly, both non-financial corporations and households may 
have to face additional tightening of the credit standards for new 
loans, since financial institutions will have to pass through to their 
customers the higher cost of funding. Furthermore, if in extreme 
situations the difficulties of some institutions in refinancing their 
debt on the markets become more serious, the need to make a 
more thorough adjustment to their balance sheets may lead to 
stricter credit standards.
BOX 6.1THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TENSIONS ON RESIDENT SECTOR FINANCING (cont’d)
1  For more detailed information on the equations used in this projection 
exercise, see Nieto and Nieto (2011), La transmisión de los tipos de in-
terés de mercado a los tipos de interés bancarios en España.
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capital stock or voting rights held by third parties and relative weight of wholesale funding) 
and empowered the FROB to recapitalise those institutions failing to comply with these 
new requirements on their own.
In addition, the process of restructuring of the Spanish financial system initiated in the 
previous year was speeded up, so that by the cut-off date of this Annual Report the num-
ber of savings banks had been reduced from 45 to 18 institutions or groups. This process 
of integration has been accompanied by the restructuring of the institutions involved. The 
consolidation of the financial system, once it is operationally complete, will entail a sig-
nificant decrease in capacity, which will help to reduce the excess size accumulated dur-
ing the long expansionary stage. The implications of these changes are discussed in Sec-
tion 4 of this chapter, although other regular publications of the Banco de España, such as 
the Financial Stability Report and the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain, discuss in 
greater detail the situation of the financial system and the restructuring and recapitalisa-
tion strategy.
Since end-2010, Spain has tended to decouple from the countries most seriously affected 
by the market tension. The request for financial assistance by the Portuguese authorities 
in April 2011, and the deterioration in Portugal’s sovereign spread which preceded it, did 
not, in fact, have an impact on Spanish financial variables comparable to that caused by 
the Greek and Irish crises. In any event, risk premia remain at high levels and subject to 
fluctuations linked to the varying market perception of the various events relating to the 
development and management of the sovereign debt crisis in the various countries.
Against this background, the activity of credit institutions has been subject to significant 
pressure. First, the sovereign debt crisis led to a significant rise in their funding costs, both 
on the wholesale markets and, indirectly, in funds obtained through deposits, because of 
the heightened competition for alternative sources of funds. Second, they have continued 
absorbing the losses derived from the impairment of assets relating to construction and 
real estate development, a segment in which doubtless asset ratios have continued to 
grow rapidly (see Chart 6.1).
The cost of bank financing to households and firms has remained low. Since mid-2010, 
however, it has tended to increase as a result of progressive pass-through of the higher 
cost of financial institutions’ liabilities to loan interest rates. This pass-through is not yet 
complete, so further increases will probably be seen.
Meanwhile, credit standards remained stringent and, according to the bank lending survey 
(BLS), tightened further during the past year, albeit moderately, and also during the first 
three months of this year in the household lending segment.
Against this background, household debt remained practically stagnant in 2010 and has 
contracted slightly since the beginning of 2011. In firms, bank credit decreased in real 
estate-related activities, and in other areas showed practically zero or slightly positive 
growth.
Despite the stagnation of household liabilities in recent years, the debt ratio scarcely de-
creased from the high levels of mid-2008 due to income sluggishness (see Box 6.2). The 
notable weight of debt for house purchase and its long repayment period also help to 
explain the slowness with which household leverage is being corrected. Meanwhile, 
wealth again decreased in 2010, basically due to the loss in value of the real estate com-
… which contributed, along 
with others adopted at 
national and European level, 
to easing the tension, although 
risk premia remain at high 
levels and subject to high 
volatility
Credit institutions have come 
under significant pressure…
… and, since early 2011, they 
have begun to pass through 
the higher cost of liabilities to 
loans
The debt of households and 
non-financial corporations 
continued to show little 
dynamism…
… although debt ratios 
scarcely changed due to the 
behaviour of income
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The notable increase in household and non-financial corporation 
liabilities between the mid-1990s and the outbreak of the crisis 
took the debt of both these sectors to historically high levels, 
above those in the rest of the euro area. Household debt currently 
stands at nearly 125% of gross disposable income, above the 
euro area average (98%) and similar to the ratio in the United 
States (one of the 19%), although below that in the United King-
dom (151%) (see Chart 1). Since the highs of mid-2008, which 
practically tripled those of the mid-1990s, the decrease in this in-
dicator has been very slight (scarcely 5 pp). Two factors explain 
the slowness of this process: first, the weakness of household in-
come in this period (denominator of the ratio), and, second, the 
long debt repayment periods of house purchase loans.1 These 
loans constitute the bulk of the financing of this sector in Spain, 
and this, even in the current situation of little new lending, makes 
BOX 6.2DELEVERAGING OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR
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1  On average, in Spain the residual maturity of collateralised loans is 14 
years.
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it difficult to reduce liabilities quickly. Deleveraging must thus be a 
process sustained over time, the duration of which will depend, 
among other things, on the economy’s capacity to recover.
To assess the implications of the level of leverage, it is important 
to analyse the final purpose of the liabilities. In this respect, in 
Spain the higher household debt compared with other euro area 
countries can be traced to the residential mortgage component, 
since the ratio consumer credit is much the same fraction of gross 
disposable income as in other euro area economies. This, in turn, 
is related to the greater propensity to invest in housing in Spain 
(which reflects the greater preference for ownership and the popu-
larity of second homes), with the consequent higher levels of 
wealth, even after deducting debt (see Chart 2). Unquestionably, 
the fact that a large part of these liabilities is secured by assets 
tends to mitigate some sources of vulnerability associated with 
such debt. The greater wealth of households would, in principle, 
allow them to save a smaller proportion of their income and to 
spend less on rental than the households of other economies with 
a lower percentage of owner occupancy (see Chart 3). However, 
this situation is not exempt from significant risks, for the following 
reasons. First, although there are no homogeneous statistics to 
allow a comparison of the total debt burden of households, all the 
evidence indicates that, as a proportion of disposable income, the 
debt burden in Spain is higher than the euro area average, even if 
rental expense is added in, which reduces the funds available for 
consumption. Second, since wealth is more concentrated in prop-
erty ownership than in other countries, it tends to be less liquid, 
and thus less available for use in coping with unforeseen situa-
tions, and, in addition, it is more sensitive to changes in house 
prices, thus showing sharper negative wealth effects in situations 
like the present one of declining values. Lastly, a high level of debt 
increases vulnerability to interest rate rises (given the marked pre-
dominance of floating rate loans in Spain) or to adverse shocks in 
income (such as, for example, job loss). In this respect, the recent 
crisis has increased the percentage of households with debts 
which, as a result of the rise in unemployment, are in a more fragile 
position, which has naturally obliged them to cut spending more 
than if they did not have those financial obligations.
In the case of firms, corporate indebtedness in Spain, measured in 
terms of gross operating surplus, is higher than in the euro area as 
a whole and than in the United States and in the United Kingdom 
(see Chart 4). As with households, the scant dynamism of busi-
ness profits has constrained the correction of the debt to income 
ratio in the last few years (since 2008 it has decreased by 12 pp, 
scarcely 1% of its value).
The aggregate corporate debt indicator conceals, however, a high 
sectoral dispersion. Thus, Chart 5 shows that in most areas of 
activity the debt to income ratio is higher than in the rest of the 
euro area, the difference being extremely marked in some of them. 
In the case of real estate activities and construction, which ac-
count for a significant part of corporate debt in Spain (practically 
half of bank loans, the main financing instrument used by firms). 
The high volume of debt in these cases basically reflects the am-
ple stock of unsold real estate assets. As this stock is progres-
sively absorbed, these liabilities will tend to be transferred to the 
agents which acquired the real estate (mainly households), al-
though maybe some of these outstanding loans will end up being 
written off. All this will tend to reduce the debt ratio. Indeed, it is in 
firms of this type where debt adjustments have been sharpest in 
the last two years.
Also in manufacturing and in hotels and restaurants, the levels of 
debt are very high in comparison with those in other euro area 
countries, although, in these cases, the divergences have in-
creased particularly sharply since the outbreak of the crisis due to 
the unfavourable trend in income. It can therefore be expected that 
a portion of the deleveraging will take place through the recovery of 
business surpluses. In fact, in terms of balance sheet size, the dif-
ferences from other euro area economies are not so marked (see 
Chart 6). By contrast, in other sectors (wholesale and retail trade 
and transport, storage and communication), the leverage ratio is 
similar to or lower than in the rest of the euro area. In any event, the 
high corporate indebtedness detracts from the dynamism of in-
vestment because it makes it harder for firms to expand activity 
with debt financing, while the financial obligation to pay interest 
and repay principal reduce the funds available for expenses.
The deleveraging of the private sector initiated in the last few years is far 
from having concluded. The most important contribution to this pro-
cess will come from the recovery of income. Therefore, actions taken 
to boost economic growth are the best way to quickly complete the 
process which will prevent the high debt from weakening spending, 
especially in a setting in which interest rates will tend to increase.
BOX 6.2DELEVERAGING OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR (cont’d)
ponent as house prices fell by 3.5% in the year as a whole. With the 2011 Q1 figure, which 
showed an increased rate of contraction, the cumulative fall is 15% (20% in real terms) 
from the high at the beginning of 2008. It should also be kept in mind that there is a no-
table dispersion in wealth across the sector, so the aggregate indicators fail to capture 
the deterioration that may have taken place in the groups in a more fragile position, such 
as, for example, unemployed debtors. Also, the prolongation of the crisis and the pattern 
of slow recovery are eroding the resources that households can deploy to deal with the 
deterioration of their situation.
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In the case of non-financial corporations, the recovery of business profits, the scant dyna-
mism of borrowing and the lower average cost of outstanding debt gave rise to a slight 
decrease in the debt ratio and the associated debt burden. In any event, the leverage of the 
business sector as a whole remains high, although the dispersion within the sector is high.
The fiscal consolidation programme implemented by general government was instrumen-
tal in slowing the sector’s liabilities following the marked deterioration in public finances in 
2009, although they continued to grow rapidly. This, together with the scant economic 
dynamism, led to an increase in the public debt ratio and in the debt burden to GDP ratio.
Although financial market tensions have eased in the early months of 2011, the continuing 
high risk premia mean that the possibility of a worsening cannot be ruled out. This would 
be particularly injurious for an economy which continues to depend on the savings of the 
rest of the world. The higher cost of funding for institutions, the economic situation of 
some borrowers and financial institutions’ exposure to the real estate sector continue to 
pose significant challenges. Therefore, the actions aimed at strengthening the economy’s 
ability to grow and those designed to underpin the soundness of the financial system con-
tinue to be essential not only to restore the GDP growth rates needed to complete the 
convergence of the Spanish economy with the standards of the more developed European 
countries, but also to complete the process of recovery of investor confidence initiated at 
the beginning of the year.
The recovery of growth, moreover, is essential also for correcting the high leverage of the 
non-financial private sector, which has barely been corrected since the peaks recorded at 
the beginning of the crisis, and which continues to hinder the expansion of demand, since 
it reduces the scope for financing consumption and investment through borrowing and 
consumes a large part of the disposable income of the sector.
Spanish financial market prices were strongly affected by the tensions arising from the 
sovereign debt crisis. The yields on general government securities rose and the spreads 
over the German bund widened (see Box 6.1). The rise affected all terms, although it was 
somewhat sharper in the short- and medium-term tranches of the yield curve (up to three 
years), where yields increased by nearly two percentage points (pp) in 2010 (see Chart 6.2). 
Also, funding costs of financial institutions increased as a reflection of investors’ doubts 
regarding the situation of some savings banks. By contrast, the interest rates on securities 
issued by non-financial corporations increased more moderately, benefiting from the broad 
international diversification of the firms which use this type of instruments for financing.
The period of highest tension came at the end of November. Subsequently, the risk premia 
of resident issuers tended to decrease. The behaviour of volatility was not unrelated to the 
measures taken by Spanish and European authorities. In any event, these premia remain 
high and subject to major fluctuations.
The turmoil also spread to the stock markets, where prices fell and volatility rose, ending 
the favourable trend seen since March 2009. At the time of greatest debt market tension 
(at the end of November), the IBEX 35 was down by 22.4% on its end-2009 level. This 
performance was worse than those of the EUROSTOXX 50, the EU stock exchange index, 
which at that date was down by 10.6%, and the US S&P 500, which was up by 5.9%. 
Among the sectors showing the sharpest falls were real estate (55%) and finance (33.6%). 
Subsequently, this trend reversed, and stock markets rose in most sectors, although vola-
tility continued to be high.
The debt and debt burden of 
general government continued 
to rise
If the recent economic policy 
actions continue in the same 
vein as in the past, the 
recovery of investor 
confidence will firm, although 
risks persist…
… and the high private sector 
indebtedness continues to 
hinder the recovery of 
spending
2 The Spanish financial 
markets
2.1 MARKET PRICES
The sovereign debt crisis has 
raised the financing costs of 
resident issuers in the fixed 
income markets…
… and has caused stock 
market prices to fall and 
volatility to rise
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Net issuance of bonds by resident sectors fell sharply to €74 bn, compared with €190 bn in 
the previous year (see Table 6.1). This was explained basically by the decrease in net borrow-
ing by general government and credit institutions, although it was also true that the tighter 
financing conditions in these markets did not favour the use of this means of financing.
The bulk of net bond issuance was by general government (€76 bn). This amount, which 
represented a decrease of €51 bn with respect to 2009, resulted from an increase in the 
volume issued by regional governments and a decrease in issuance by State government, 
these variations being in line with the changes in the borrowing needs of these two sub-
sectors. Despite the tensions prevailing on financial markets and the downgrades in Span-
ish debt ratings by rating agencies, the Spanish bond auctions achieved ample coverage 
(demand to allotted funds) ratios, albeit at a progressively higher cost. Of the €63 bn is-
sued by the State, more than 93% was medium and long term, meaning that the average 
life of outstanding debt was lengthened from 6.4 to 6.6 years, thus contributing to reduce 
the refinancing risk.
As a result of credit institutions’ lower funding needs and of the wholesale market ten-
sions, monetary financial institutions and their resident and non-resident subsidiaries 
made net redemptions of bonds amounting to €15 bn. There was a shift towards instru-
ments involving lower risk. Thus, issues of paper guaranteed by the State and of covered 
2.2 THE PRIMARY MARKETS
Net issuance of marketable 
debt securities decreased 
appreciably…
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bonds amounted, in net terms, to €12 bn and €13 bn, respectively, while gross placements 
of other instruments were less than maturities. Against a background in which the securiti-
sation market continues to be inactive and in which institutions hold an ample volume of 
collateral, the balance of the securities issued by financial vehicle corporations (asset-
backed bonds) fell for the first time in many years. By contrast, net issuance by non-finan-
cial corporations turned positive again (€10 bn, including that by resident and non-resident 
subsidiaries). The higher net borrowing by firms of this type (basically large multinationals), 
whose business is highly diversified internationally, and the fact that these have been less 
affected by the financial turmoil explain the greater dynamism of this primary market seg-
ment compared with that of financial firms.
Equity issuance by both credit institutions and non-financial corporations increased, 
amounting in total to €15 bn, up 45% on 2009. However, it should be noted that this 
growth was heavily influenced by two specific transactions (one in each sector).
Secondary market activity varied across segments (see Table 6.2). In public debt, the vol-
ume traded remained somewhat below €19,000 bn, combining an increase in spot transac-
tions, which grew by nearly 90% despite momentary liquidity problems following the out-
breaks of tension in May and November, and a decrease in repo and sell/buy-back 
transactions. The fall in the latter is partly associated with problems of investor confidence 
since, when tensions peaked, investors perceived a high risk in bilateral repo transactions 
with Spanish institutions, believing there was a high negative correlation between the risk of 
default by financial institutions and the value of the asset used as collateral in these transac-
tions (Spanish Treasury debt). In the second half of the year some institutions begin to oper-
… but, by contrast, issuance 
of equity securities increased
2.3 SECONDARY MARKET 
ACTIVITY
Secondary market trading varied 
depending on the segment
2007 2008 2009 2010
NET ISSUANCE BY RESIDENTS 268.3 145.9 199.7 89.5
    FIXED INCOME 222.4 131.1 189.5 74.7
        Monetary ?nancial institutions 78.2 -26.9 39.6 7.8
        Other ?nancial intermediaries 146.5 104.6 21.5 -10.9
        Of which:
            Financial vehicle corporations 106.9 95.0 14.9 -5.9
            Subsidiaries of monetary ?nancial institutions 34.5 7.4 -8.8 -12.2
            Subsidiaries of non-?nancial corporations 4.5 3.0 14.5 7.4
        Non-?nancial corporations 2.0 1.9 0.7 1.3
        Central government -4.7 50.2 119.4 63.2
        Regional and local government 0.4 1.4 8.4 13.2
    EQUITIES 46.0 14.8 10.2 14.8
        Monetary ?nancial institutions 12.0 10.0 3.0 6.6
        Other ?nancial intermediaries 3.5 1.4 0.4 0.1
        Non-?nancial corporations 30.5 3.4 6.8 8.1
PUBLIC OFFERINGS 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.5
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
    Net issuance by foreign subsidiaries 9.5 12.9 -2.0 -8.9
        Financial institutions 8.2 14.3 -3.4 -10.6
        Non-?nancial corporations 1.3 -1.4 1.4 1.7
ISSUANCE AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES TABLE 6.1
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
€bn 
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ate in repo markets with central counterparties clearing houses, in which the supposed link 
is substantially diluted. In this way, trading was channelled partly through foreign trading 
platforms (such as BrokerTec or Eurex Repo), instead of through the Spanish debt market.
The volumes traded on the AIAF bond market remained around the levels of 2009. The 
decrease in spot transactions was offset by the increase in repo and sell/buy-back trans-
actions. A major feature was the fall in covered bond and asset-backed bond transactions, 
which had grown notably in the previous two years. By contrast, the downward trend in 
equity market trading volumes since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 was inter-
rupted. The volumes of spot and derivatives transactions moved up above €1,000 bn and 
€1,200 bn, respectively. However, this increase also reflected, at least in part, the climb in 
average prices, which raised the unit value of transactions.
The nation’s net borrowing decreased again last year, falling, in 12-month cumulated 
terms, to a figure equivalent to 3.9% of GDP (compared with 5.1% at end-2009, as shown 
by Chart 6.3). The behaviour of financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world evidences the 
considerable difficulties that the Spanish economy has had in raising funds abroad as a 
result of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
In line with the lower borrowing requirements and the greater difficulty in raising funds as a 
result of the sovereign debt crisis, the funds received from abroad decreased again in 2010, 
being limited to a figure equivalent to 0.6% of GDP, down from the 4.9% recorded in the 
previous year and well below the 23.7% reached in 2007 (see Table 6.3). Capital inflows 
were channelled mainly through instruments issued by non-financial corporations and gen-
eral government, specifically loans from the rest of the world and shares, in the first case, 
and fixed income securities, in the second case. The funds raised by the latter instrument 
by general government amounted to 2% of GDP. By contrast, the volume of securities is-
sued by financial institutions held by the rest of the world decreased (by 1.1% of GDP in the 
case of credit institutions, and by 2.4% of GDP for other financial institutions including fi-
3 External investment in 
and financing of the 
Spanish economy
The financial tensions made it 
more difficult to raise funds 
abroad
Borrowing requirements were 
met through capital inflows 
channelled mainly in the form 
of instruments issued by 
general government and non-
financial corporations…
2007 2008 2009 2010
PUBLIC-DEBT BOOK-ENTRY MARKET (a) 22,664 19,944 18,522 18,552
    Spot 3,177 2,202 2,470 4,635
    Repos and sell/buy-back agreements 19,193 17,477 15,903 13,761
    Forward 294 265 150 156
AIAF FIXED-INCOME MARKET 900 2,401 3,692 3,658
    Commercial paper 482 577 529 383
    Covered bonds and asset-backed securities 329 1,740 2,849 2,413
    Other 90 83 314 862
STOCK EXCHANGE: FIXED INCOME 90 80 75 67
STOCK EXCHANGE: EQUITIES 1,670 1,245 898 1,038
MEFF DERIVATIVES MARKETS 1,451 1,073 710 1,263
    IBEX 35  1,384 989 622 1,158
    Equity derivatives 68 84 88 105
 TURNOVER ON SECONDARY AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS TABLE  6.2
€bn 
SOURCES: Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Federation of European Stock Exchanges and Banco de España.
a Only includes transactions in State securities.
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nancial vehicle corporations). There was also a slight decrease in the net debit position in 
the interbank market, along with an accompanying change in its composition. In particular, 
flows in the form of collateralised transactions increased considerably, being favoured by the 
trading in central counterparty clearing houses, and uncollateralised net transactions fell.
The nation’s net borrowing was covered, lastly, by the reduction of external assets held by 
residents (3.3% of GDP). Noteworthy was the contraction in holdings of securities other 
than shares by an amount equivalent to 7% of GDP, in net terms, effected mainly by insti-
tutional investors and credit institutions. By contrast, there was an increase in acquisitions 
of shares and other equity securities (2.3% of GDP). In this line, the downward path fol-
lowed over the past two years by Spanish foreign direct investment was interrupted and 
this item increased by 0.9 pp to 1.6% of GDP, an amount similar to that represented by the 
direct investment of non-residents in Spain, which also increased by nearly 1 pp.
Despite the net negative sign of the nation’s financial transactions, the movements in prices 
(upwards in assets and downwards in liabilities) meant that the balance of the nation’s net 
liabilities to the rest of the world decreased by nearly 4 pp to around 85% of GDP, according 
to the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy (see Chart 6.3). External assets amount-
ed to 130% of GDP, while gross liabilities were 215% (165% relating to gross debt and 50% 
to equity). Sectoral analysis shows that financial institutions had the largest net debit posi-
tion vis-à-vis the rest of the world, followed by general government (amounting in the first 
case to 52% of GDP and in the second to 25.4%). The net debit position of the non-finan-
cial private sector is close to 13% of GDP, down 4 pp on the previous year.
The effects of the crisis in Spain and the tensions in financial markets set in motion a 
merger and restructuring process in financial institutions which particularly affected 
savings banks. The objectives of this process, furthered by the creation of the FROB in 
… and also through the 
reduction of external assets 
held by residents
The balance of the nation’s net 
liabilities decreased slightly
4 Spanish financial 
intermediaries
4.1 CREDIT INSTITUTIONS2
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2  For more details of the situation of Spanish credit institutions, see the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain and 
the Financial Stability Report of the Banco de España, the specialised publications of the Banco de España which 
discuss these subjects in greatest depth.
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2007 2008 2009 2010
NET FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS -9.6 -9.2 -5.1 -3.9
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (ASSETS) 14.1 0.7 -0.2 -3.3
    Gold and SDRs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Cash and deposits 1.4 -1.3 -3.2 -1.4
    Of which:
        Interbank, credit institutions (a) 4.2 -0.5 -1.7 -1.3
    Securities other than shares 1.6 1.3 0.0 -6.9
    Of which:
        Credit institutions 1.8 1.5 1.2 -3.0
        Institutional investors 0.0 -1.3 -0.5 -3.3
    Shares and other equity 8.8 1.7 1.6 2.4
    Of which:
        Non-?nancial corporations 6.6 3.0 0.1 2.4
        Institutional investors -1.1 -1.6 0.3 0.8
    Loans 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.4
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (LIABILITIES) 23.7 9.9 4.9 0.6
    Deposits 6.7 8.0 -0.5 -0.5
    Of which:
        Interbank, credit institutions (a) 6.7 6.2 0.7 -7.3
        Repos, credit institutions (b) 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.7
        Interbank, BE (intra-system position) -0.3 1.9 -0.8 0.2
    Securities other than shares 8.1 -2.7 3.8 -1.5
    Of which:
        General government -1.3 1.1 5.4 2.0
        Credit institutions 3.6 -1.9 1.1 -1.1
        Other non-monetary ?nancial institutions 5.8 -1.9 -2.6 -2.4
    Shares and other equity 4.6 3.2 1.1 0.8
    Of which:
        Non-?nancial corporations 4.7 2.4 0.3 1.1
    Loans 3.1 2.9 0.3 1.2
    Other, net (c) 0.2 0.2 -1.1 -1.7
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Spanish direct investment abroad 9.5 4.7 0.7 1.6
    Foreign direct investment in Spain 4.5 4.8 0.6 1.5
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATION  
Cumulative four-quarter data 
TABLE 6.3 
% of GDP 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Excluding repos. 
b Including transactions with central counterparty clearing houses. 
c Includes, along with other items, the asset-side caption showing insurance technical reserves and the ne???ow of trade credit.
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2009, are various. First, after a period of vigorous growth in banking activity, the system 
as a whole had reached a size which, although commensurate with the relative weight 
reached in other developed economies, was excessive in a scenario characterised by a 
moderating trend in the growth rate of financial activity and by the need for deleveraging 
of a significant portion of Spanish households and firms. The concentration of financial 
institutions also aims to achieve synergies and economies of scale to make for more 
efficient financial intermediation. A larger size of the resulting groups should make it 
easier to achieve additional increases in efficiency and to access the capital markets. 
Along these same lines, the exercise of savings bank financial activity by limited liability 
companies licensed as banks broadens the range of instruments accessible to the lat-
ter, enabling them to issue ordinary shares. Finally, the process under way contributes 
to strengthening the solvency of the sub-sector and to improving its management ca-
pacity, since some of the more vulnerable institutions are now being absorbed by others 
in a stronger position.
Although the process of concentration is not limited only to savings banks, most of the 
concentration transactions are taking place in this sub-sector. This is basically because of 
the more pronounced imbalances accumulated in the phase preceding the crisis: faster 
balance sheet growth and excess capacity, greater need to raise funds through the issu-
ance of securities on wholesale markets instead of traditional instruments and a higher 
exposure to the real estate development sector. Nor should it be overlooked that these 
institutions were characterised by a singular corporate structure which hindered the issu-
ance of high-quality capital instruments (voting shares) in a crisis situation, when the vol-
ume of internally generated funds decreases considerably. Recent events have also dem-
onstrated the need for substantial improvements in the governance of these institutions.
As shown in the top left panel of Chart 6.4, the processes of concentration under way have 
involved most of the savings bank sector, although not all savings banks have made use 
of government funds. In terms of the credit system as a whole, the savings banks involved 
in mergers with assistance from the FROB represent somewhat more than 20% of total 
assets, while those that have undertaken processes of this type without the use of govern-
ment funds represent 11% of the total.
In this process up to December 2010, the FROB had committed a total of €11,559 million 
(see top right panel of Chart 6.4). On 10 March 2011, the Banco de España made public the 
additional amounts to be raised by the various Spanish credit institutions to comply with 
the new capital requirements approved at the beginning of 2011 on the basis of their situa-
tion at 31 December 2010. In all, they amount to a €15,152 million, of which €14,077 million 
related to savings banks. Subsequently, the initial project of the Banco Base institutional 
protection scheme (IPS), for which assistance of €1,493 million had been earmarked (this 
amount was included in the aforementioned €11,559 million), was aborted and the two in-
stitutions or groups resulting from that rupture designed their recapitalisation strategies to 
meet the new needs derived from the provisions of Royal Decree-Law 2/2011. This entailed 
some changes with respect to the situation in March. In any event, the amount of the sec-
tor’s recapitalisation needs finally covered by the FROB will depend on the private funds 
raised by institutions and on their possible strategic decisions on asset sales or concentra-
tion transactions. However, in any event, the final outcome will be that Spanish intermediar-
ies will find themselves, in September of this year (or March 2012 at the latest) with a mini-
mum core capital3 ratio of 8% or 10%, depending on the characteristics of the institution.
2010 saw a significant 
concentration in Spanish 
savings banks
The process has been 
supported only partially by 
government aid and 
accompanied by the 
recapitalisation of institutions
3  Defined in Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 4 March 2011. For more details, see Box 1.2 of this Annual Report.
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Although the process is still under way, the changes in 2010 entailed a significant transfor-
mation of the Spanish savings bank sector. In terms of the size of institutions and of their 
degree of concentration (see the bottom panels of Chart 6.4), it brought an increase in 
average size from €28 bn at end-2008 to €70 bn two years later. The number of savings 
banks decreased from 45 to 18 savings bank institutions or groups.
Institutionally, the process took the form of both mergers (seven operations) and the for-
mation of IPSs (five operations). The latter necessarily involve the formation of a commer-
cial bank which acts as the central institution of the IPS, carrying out its financial activity 
and to which the bulk of the group’s assets have been or will shortly be transferred. In this 
way, practically all financial activity is transferred to institutions which are limited liability 
companies, thereby altering the previous corporate structure. This movement was 
strengthened by the reform of the savings bank law and by the capital reinforcement re-
quirements laid down by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011.
The savings bank law reform included in Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010 
made it possible for all savings banks to indirectly exercise their financial activity 
through a commercial bank. Subsequently, Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 accentuated this 
trend by encouraging the entry of private investors in the capital of institutions. The in-
tention here is to foster more professional management, increase the role of market 
discipline and, at the same time, make it easier to raise additional top-quality capital 
All this has brought a 
substantial change in the 
structure of the savings bank 
sector
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c Consolidated data. Those relating to December 2010 take into account the group structure at the beginning of May 2011. 
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where necessary. The Royal Decree-Law also increases the minimum level of core cap-
ital (10%, as against 8%) for those institutions that have not distributed to third parties 
equity securities representing 20% or more of their capital and raise a significant por-
tion of their funds in the wholesale financial markets. Compliance with the first part of 
these requirements requires the existence of an institution legally organised as a limited 
liability company which can issue these securities, leaving to one side the possibility of 
issuing non-voting equity units (“cuotas participativas”) of savings banks. In addition, it 
is made compulsory to choose the option of indirect exercise of financial activity in or-
der to be eligible for the new assistance from the FROB, which in all cases will take the 
form of acquisition of ordinary shares of the group. These acquisitions will necessarily 
be temporary and the related securities will be resold to private investors and within a 
maximum of five years, whereupon the final result will be the same.
On 14 April of this year the Banco de España approved the various strategies which the 
institutions involved had drawn up to meet the new capital requirements. Two weeks later, 
on 28 April and within the legally stipulated time period, those savings banks or groups of 
savings banks which have chosen the FROB as the primary source of capital funding to 
meet these new requirements submitted their plans.
Against this background, the consolidated total assets of Spanish institutions as a whole 
increased slightly as a result of the growth of business abroad, since that in Spain re-
mained practically stagnant, for the second year running (see Table 6.4).4 Moreover, in 
December the number of branches and staff in Spain had decreased by 6% and 5%, re-
spectively, from their peaks in 2008, and the institutions involved in merger processes with 
FROB support recorded the provisions needed to cover the cost of the agreed headcount 
and branch network reductions over the next few years.
The credit granted to the resident private sector also shrank slightly. According to the bank 
lending survey, this seems to be due to sluggish demand and shrinking supply. Demand 
remained basically stagnant in the case of non-financial corporations, fluctuated through-
out the year with no clear trend in respect of household residential mortgages and per-
formed somewhat more negatively in consumer credit and other lending to households. 
The credit standards for the approval of new loans continued to be st rict and generally 
tightened slightly in 2010 Q2, mainly as a result of wholesale financial market tensions, 
although subsequently they remained steady. In the early months of 2011 they tightened 
further in the household credit segment.
The interest rates applied in new loans to households and non-financial corporations re-
mained low. However, from the beginning of this year institutions have begun to pass 
through more actively the higher cost of their liabilities to their lending rates. This has re-
sulted in a rise of between 55 basis points (bp) and 115 bp in the cost of bank financing to 
households and firms between June 2010 and March 2011.
The difficulty in raising funds on the wholesale markets and their higher cost meant that 
the institutions temporarily had to resort more to the Eurosystem in spring and summer. 
Subsequently, such recourse to the Eurosystem decreased to account for only 1.4% of the 
consolidated total balance sheet at December 2010 (against 2% a year earlier) and have 
continued to decrease during this year. Their place has basically been taken by funds from 
Total assets in Spain remained 
stagnant and the number of 
branches and staff decreased
There was a decrease in the 
volume of credit granted
… and the cost rose 
moderately
...partly influenced by the 
financial market tensions
4  Owing to the restructuring carried out in the last few days of the year, the figures for 2010 had to be adjusted to make 
them comparable with those for 2009. This comparison must therefore be interpreted with caution.
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repo transactions carried out through foreign central counterparties. The net funds raised 
in this way amounted to around €60 bn at end-2010, against a value of practically zero at 
the beginning of that year. Nevertheless, the market tensions also prompted fiercer com-
petition for deposits from the public, the cost of which increased significantly (54 bp be-
tween December 2009 and March 2011, in time deposits).
Credit institutions also recorded significant write-downs. Thus, while the growth rate of 
doubtful assets moderated (from year-on-year growth of 48% in 2009 to 15% in 2010), 
provisions continued to increase at a rate of more than 25%. In 2010 additional provisions 
were charged to cover losses on foreclosed real estate and other commitments relating to 
Cumulative provisions and 
write-downs are high
Dec-09 Dec-10 Y-o-y rate (%) Dec-09 Dec-10 Y-o-y rate (%)
MAIN BALANCE SHEET ITEMS (% of TA)
TOTAL ASSETS (€bn) 3,739.9 3,816.5 2.0 3,142.4 3,122.0 -0.6
    Credit 64.1 63.4 0.8 61.5 61.2 -1.2
    Of which: resident private sector in Spain 56.1 55.4 -1.8
        Debt securities 13.5 12.8 -3.4 13.2 12.7 -4.6
        Other assets 22.4 23.8 8.8 25.3 26.1 2.6
LIABILITIES
    Banco de España and other central banks 3.3 2.5 -23.2 3.6 2.4 -33.7
    Interbank deposits (b) 14.2 15.6 12.0 17.6 19.6 10.5
    Customer deposits (c) 49.6 50.6 4.1 50.5 49.9 -1.7
    Of which: households and non-?n.corps. res. in Spain 29.3 30.4 3.1
        Marketable securities 17.0 14.6 -12.2 12.5 11.4 -9.6
        Other liabilities 9.8 10.9 13.2 9.8 11.0 12.1
        Equity 6.1 5.8 -2.4 6.0 5.6 -6.9
INCOME STATEMENT (% of ATA)
    (+) Interest income 4.10 3.35 -15.7 3.42 2.54 -25.0
    (–) Interest expense 2.12 1.57 -23.7 1.97 1.39 -28.8
    Net interest income 1.98 1.78 -7.1 1.45 1.15 -19.9
    Gross margin 3.01 2.78 -5.1 2.26 2.10 -6.3
    (–) Operating expenses 1.30 1.32 4.1 0.98 0.97 0.0
    (–) Write-downs of and provisions for ?nancial assets 1.05 0.85 -14.9 0.77 0.72 -4.3
    Operating pro?t 0.67 0.61 -7.6 0.53 0.42 -21.1
    After-tax pr??t 0.54 0.47 -10.0 0.42 0.32 -23.7
RATIOS (%)
    Solvency 12.2 11.9
    Doubtful assets/TA 3.1 3.5 3.1 3.5
    Foreign operations/TA 23.3 26.3
    E??ciency (OE/GI) 43.1 47.2 43.2 45.1
    ROE (d) 9.3 7.5 7.1 5.7
CONSOLIDATED INDIVIDUAL
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT (a) 
TABLE 6.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Owing to the restructuring processes carried out in the closing days of the year, the 201???gures have had to be adjusted to make them comparable with those 
of 2009. This comparison therefore had to be regarded with some caution.  
b Including money market transactions with central counterparties. 
c Including liabilities to securitisatio???nancial vehicle corporations. 
d Although stated at both consolidated and individual level, it should be noted that this item is more representative in the former case, since the individua???gure does 
not include all group operations. 
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planned staff reductions. In all, from January 2008 the sector has recognised and borne 
€96 bn of losses on its assets, representing approximately 5% of total credit to the private 
sector at December 2007 and 9% of GDP.
Provisioning charges, along with the contraction in net interest income, resulted in a fur-
ther decrease in net profits, which, however, remained positive (see Table 6.4).
Despite the lower profits earned, Spanish credit institutions continued to increase their 
top-quality capital (core capital) until it accounted for 9.5% of total risk-weighted as-
sets at end-2010 (including contributions from the FROB). At the same time, the overall 
solvency ratio decreased slightly from 12.2% in December 2009 to 11.9% twelve 
months later. During 2011, as a result of the new requirements approved by the govern-
ment in February, the less well capitalised institutions are making additional advances 
in this respect.
In any event, institutions still face significant challenges relating to the still-fragile eco-
nomic situation of some of their borrowers, the higher cost of their funding sources and 
their exposure to the real estate sector, so they will have to continue making efforts to 
strengthen their financial position and reduce their cost structure.
The activity of institutional investors continued to be affected by the competition for funds 
in the form of bank deposits and by the still high perception of risk by savers. This led, yet 
another year, to a decline in the net assets of collective investment companies and funds 
and to a modest increase in the case of insurance companies and pension funds (see 
Chart 6.5).
Holders of investment funds made net redemptions during the year, these withdrawals be-
ing most notable in those institutions with a more conservative investment policy (money 
market funds and short-term bond funds), which are the ones that compete most directly 
with credit institutions. Meanwhile, the renewed financial market tensions led to lower 
yields than in the previous year, practically across the board. Against this background, 
management entities continued to market mainly instruments of the conservative nature. 
The high debt issuance by Spanish general government and the greater preference for 
instruments issued by residents favoured a further increase in the holdings of securities of 
this type, while external assets decreased.
Investment by private equity institutions showed a notable recovery in comparison with 
the previous year, albeit based mainly on the activity of foreign operators. By contrast, the 
funds raised by Spanish private equity institutions decreased slightly with respect to 2009, 
as did those raised by real estate funds and hedge funds.
The process of savings bank concentration may affect the structure of the sector in the 
coming quarters, given the significant weight of savings bank subsidiaries in collective 
investment.
Following its significant deceleration between mid-2006 and end-2009, household debt 
remained practically flat in 2010 as a result of a slight increase in that incurred for real es-
tate purchases and a moderate decrease in consumer credit and other lending. Since the 
beginning of the current year, it has contracted slightly as a result of a decrease in both 
these components.
Write-downs and the 
contraction of net interest 
income resulted in a fresh 
decline in profits in 2010
The new capital requirements 
and the increased 
transparency should help to 
normalise access to market 
funding, although significant 
challenges persist
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The competition from bank 
deposits and the high 
perception of risk by savers 
continued to affect the sector 
negatively
5 The financial flows and 
balance sheet position of 
the non-financial sector
5.1 HOUSEHOLDS
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Despite the scat momentum of household debt, the debt ratio of the sector remained 
steady due to the stagnation of income and to the high relative weight of debt for 
house purchases and the long mortgage loan maturities, which also influence the 
dynamics of household deleveraging (see Box 6.2). This indicator thus continues at 
high levels (at end-2010 it was around 125% of GDI, some 5 pp below the peak at 
mid-2008; see Chart 1 of Box 6.2). Meanwhile, net wealth continued to fall, basically 
as a result of the declining value of the real estate component, and, to a lesser extent, 
of the financial component. The debt burden also decreased again because of the fall 
in the average cost of financing (see Chart 6.6). However, this indicator captures 
movements in interbank interest rates with a certain lag, so foreseeably the rise in 
these rates since mid-2010 will gradually pass through to debt service in the next few 
quarters.
The lower debt burden contributed to a slight fall in the doubtful asset ratios of the sector 
in 2010 (in the previous three years they had trended upwards), both for house purchase 
loans and for consumer credit and other lending (down by 0.4 pp in both cases to stand at 
2.4% and 6.6%, respectively).
Household debt remained 
practically stagnant but the 
scan dynamism of income 
prevented the debt ratio from 
decreasing, while wealth and 
the debt burden continued to 
fall
The doubtful loans ratio 
decreased
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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CHART 6.5
 SOURCES: Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, Banco de España and Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones.
a Shares and other equity in CIIs and reserves of insuranece companies and pension funds. In the case of credit institutions, deposits and repos of households and 
no???nancial corporations. 
b Includes cash, deposits and repos.
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The latest available information from the survey of household finances shows that be-
tween 2005 and early 2009 the level of financial pressure increased more markedly in 
some segments which are comparatively more vulnerable. In households in which no 
member works, the proportion of those with some type of loan increased by more than 
6 pp (the equivalent of somewhat less than 2% of total households) during this period 
to 21%, while for the sector as a whole the rise was practically zero. This change, how-
ever, basically reflects the fact that a significant number of the members of indebted 
households moved from employed to unemployed status. In the households in which 
no member works, the percentage of those with a debt burden exceeding 40% of their 
income stood at nearly 25% at the beginning of 2009 (as against 16.6% for indebted 
households as a whole). By age group, younger households showed the largest in-
creases in the proportion exceeding this threshold. Thus, for example, in households 
headed by a person below age 35 (10% of household units), it rose to 24% (9.2 pp more 
than in 2005).
From mid-2010, the debt of non-financial corporations has followed a path of recovery and 
from 2010 Q3 its growth rate has been slightly positive. By instrument, this came about 
because lending by resident credit institutions contracted more slowly and lending by non-
residents picked up, while financing obtained via fixed income securities continued to 
grow quickly. Behind this recovery are a number of differing sectoral patterns, consistent 
with a process of selective deleveraging across the various areas of activity. Thus those 
linked to the housing market continued to show negative growth rates of bank credit, while 
the others posted year-end growth rates that were positive or around zero (see Chart 6.1). 
The available information indicates that the differences between larger firms and SMEs (in 
areas unrelated to the real estate sector) seem to be less marked than those observed in 
the more acute phases of the crisis.
Net borrowing by firms showed a credit balance for the first time since 1998, for an amount 
equivalent to 1.3% of GDP, according to the Financial Accounts. However, the financing 
gap, which approximates the funds required to bridge the difference between gross cor-
porate saving and gross capital formation plus permanent foreign investment, was positive 
and stood at 0.8% of GDP, 0.5 pp less than a year earlier.
This aggregate situation is 
compatible with a more 
vulnerable financial position of 
some segments of the 
population
5.2 FIRMS
Corporate financing showed 
greater dynamism from mid-
2010 onwards, although it 
varied significantly across 
sectors
The sector became a net 
lender for the first time since 
1998
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INDICATORS OF THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHs CHART 6.6
SOURCES: Ministerio de Fomento, INE and Banco de España.
a Estimated interest payments plus debt repayments.
b Balance of use of disposable income account.
c Gross saving less estimated debt repayments.
d Calculated on the basis of the estimated changes in the stock of housing, in the average area per house and in the price per square metre.
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The aggregate financial position of the sector showed a certain improvement. The re-
covery of economic results and the scan dynamism of liabilities meant that the debt 
ratio decreased slightly and profitability increased. This performance, along with the 
decline in the average cost of outstanding debt, allowed the debt burden to drop (see 
Chart 6.7). Moreover, in the sample of firms reporting to the Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), the dispersion of the distribution of these ratios 
decreased, since the improvement was more marked in those firms in a more unfa-
vourable financial position. The overall effect of this was a reduction in the synthetic 
indicators of financial pressure on investment and employment, from the peaks 
reached between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 (see Chart 6.7). These 
developments at aggregate level were compatible with uneven behaviour across sec-
tors. Thus, according to the CBQ, the improvement in these indicators was most ap-
parent in industry, a sector which had recorded a particularly marked deterioration in 
2009. Further, analysts revised upward the profit expectations of listed companies in 
2010, both for the long-term and for the short-term, and the growth rate for the latter 
turned positive.
The financial position 
indicators of firms showed a 
certain improvement
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INDICATORS OF THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS CHART 6.7
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Estimated interest payments.
b Gross operating surplus plus ?nancial revenue.
c Aggregate of all the ?rms reporting to the CBSO belonging to the groups Endesa, Iberdrola, Repsol and Telefónica. Adjusted for intra-group ?nancing to avoid 
double counting. 
d Indicators based on debt, debt burden and pro?t ratios of the ?rms reporting to the CBSO annual and quarterly surveys, appying coe??cients to take into account the 
impact of these variables on investment and employment and to re?ect the importance of each ?rm in the total in terms of the stock of capital and of employment. 
A value of more (less) than 100 indicates higher (lower) ?nancial pressure than in the base year. For more datails, see Hernando and Martínez-Carrascal (2003), El 
? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????? ??????????? November, Banco de España. 
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Despite decreasing slightly, corporate debt continues to be high (around 800% of gross 
operating surplus), with no significant reduction since 2008. This ratio is particularly high 
in some sectors, such as construction and real estate services (see Box 6.2), where the 
doubtful assets ratio increased most sharply and reached 13.5% at end-2010 (against 
3.9% in other sectors).
The fiscal consolidation efforts made enabled the budget deficit to be reduced to 9.2% of 
GDP, 1.9 pp less than in 2009. The breakdown by instrument shows that the budget deficit 
was basically covered by long-term securities issuance for a net amount equivalent to 
6.9% of GDP (see Chart 6.8). Moreover, general government acquired securities amount-
ing to 1.7% of GDP, these investments being partly linked to the measures to support the 
financial system.
Despite slowing, the sector’s liabilities rose notably (their growth rate was 13.8%). This, 
along with the scant dynamism of GDP, resulted in an increase in indebtedness, which 
reached 60% of GDP at end-2010, nearly 7 pp more than in the previous year, and in the 
associated debt burden, albeit moderate taking it to 2% of GDP. Despite the rise in market 
interest rates, the average cost of liabilities scarcely changed, due to the slowness with 
which these movements pass through to interest payments.
5.3 GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Public sector net borrowing 
decreased, although it 
continues to be high…
… which gave rise to a 
significant rise in the sector’s 
liabilities and, as a result, in 
the debt and debt burden 
ratios
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